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1.1 What Is Personalised Medicine?
Hippocrates famously advised physicians that it is more important to
know what person the disease has than what disease the person has.
So it might well be thought that all good medical practice is persona-
lised, and that there is nothing new about that. But the phenomenon
that has been widely presented as a paradigm shift in medicine – and
which is our concern in this volume – is both more specific and more
general.
In the specific sense, personalised or precision medicine builds on the
achievements of genomic science, aiming to offer doctors and patients
more sophisticated tools ofmolecular profiling to identify and treat genetic
variants implicated in disease risk and treatment. Pharmacogenetics, prob-
ably the most advanced arm of personalised medicine, aims to minimise
adverse drug reactions and produce better responses by tailoring pharma-
ceutical regimes in cancer care and other branches of medicine to the
patient’s individual genome. For example, the application of whole-
genome sequencing to the care of a patient with early onset breast and
ovarian cancer but no significant family history revealed unsuspected
genetic defects, enabling clinicians to change her treatment plan from
bone marrow transplantation to successful targeted chemotherapy.1
Outside oncology, treatment for the liver disease hepatitis has been suc-
cessfully personalised to avoid the worst side effects for patients whose
genetic variation makes them more responsive to a lower drug dosage.2
The discovery of a ‘Goldilocks’ gene affecting patients’ inflammatory
1 Daniel C. Link et al., ‘Identification of a novel PT3 cancer susceptibility mutation through
whole-genome sequencing of a patient with therapy-related AMI’ (2011) 305 Journal of the
American Medical Association 1568–76.
2 Amy Maxmen, ‘Pharmacogenetics: playing the odds’ (2011) 474 Nature S9–S10.
1
response to tuberculosis could be crucial, particularly in the Third World,
in determining who will contract the disease and who would benefit from
steroids.3
Such is the sense captured in the following description:
Precision medicine is an approach to disease treatment and prevention
that seeks to maximize effectiveness by taking into account variability in
genes, environment and lifestyle. Precision medicine seeks to redefine our
understanding of disease onset and progression, treatment response, and
health outcomes through the more precise measurement of molecular,
environmental, and behavioral factors that contribute to health and dis-
ease. This understanding will lead to more accurate diagnoses, more
rational disease prevention strategies, better treatment selection, and the
development of novel therapies. Coincident with advancing the science of
medicine is a changing culture of medical practice and medical research
that engages individuals as active partners—not just as patients or
research subjects.4
This is the goal underpinning the announcement made by President
Obama in January 2015 of a $215 million Precision Medicine
Initiative (PMI), coupled with plans to recruit a million participants
into the accompanying ‘PMI-Cohort’ programme. As a junior sena-
tor, Obama had already championed the bill that was to become the
Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act 2007, remarking: ‘We are
in a new era of the life sciences, but in no area of research is the
promise greater than in personalized medicine.’ In these initiatives
the language of individualisation was powerfully dominant, despite
the ‘rhetorical reform’ implicit in the change of nomenclature from
‘personalised’ to ‘precision’ between the 2007 statute and the 2015
initiative.5 In the words of the White House statement accompanying
the PMI announcement:
Until now most medical treatments have been designed for the ‘average
patient’. As a result of this ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach, treatments can
3 Linda Wijlaars, ‘“Goldilocks” gene response to TB suggests best treatment’ (6 February
2012) Bionews.
4 PrecisionMedicine Initiative (PMI)Working Group Report to the Advisory Committee to
the Director, NIH, The Precision Medicine Initiative Cohort Program – Building a Research
Foundation for 21st Century Medicine (2015), September 17, p. 1. See also Maya Sabatello
and Paul S. Appelbaum, ‘The precision medicine nation’ (2017) 47(4) Hastings Center
Report 19–29.
5 Eric Juengst, Michelle L. McGowan, Jennifer R. Fishman et al., ‘From “personalized” to
“precision” medicine: the ethical and social implications of rhetorical reform in genomic
medicine’ (2016) 46 Hastings Center Report 21–33.
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be very successful for some patients but not for others. Precision
Medicine, on the other hand, is an innovative approach that takes
into account individual differences in people’s genes, environments,
and lifestyles.6
1.2 The Personalisation of Medicine and the Common Good
However, this emphasis on individualisation – ‘Me Medicine’, as one
of us has termed it7 – is controversial, despite Hippocrates’ dictum.
To begin with, it is extremely unlikely that completely individualised
treatments are ever going to be feasible. Many commentators and
clinicians acknowledge that the best aspiration is to deliver diag-
noses and treatments stratified into patient groups by genomic
science:
I don’t think that we can ever, ever become truly personal and truly
individualized . . . [T]he way I look at personalized medicine is whereby
we can stratify patient groups respective of ancestry, ethnicity, into indi-
viduals who are more likely to respond using novel technologies . . .
So I see a way of being able to subphenotype individuals in the way they’re
going to respond to drugs, and that’s what I see as personalized medicine.
So I don’t see it as individual.8
The term ‘stratified’ medicine, however, lacks the powerful appeal of
‘personalised’ medicine, with its promises of greater individual choice
and patient empowerment. These claims have been made most
explicitly by the direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing sector,
in which firms offer customers whole- or partial-genome sequencing
analyses of their risks for particular diseases. As one firm put it,
‘We use the latest science and technology to give you a view into
your DNA, revealing your genetic predisposition for important
health conditions and empowering you with knowledge to help
you take control of your health future.’9 Direct-to-consumer genetic
testing is the self-proclaimed vanguard of the personalised medicine
movement, with leading proponents advocating a proactive approach
6 Quoted in J. Patrick Woolley, Michelle L. McGowan, Harriet J. A. Teare et al., ‘Citizen
science or scientific citizenship? Disentangling the uses of public engagement rhetoric in
national research initiatives’ (2016) 17(33) BMC Medical Ethics, pp. 7–8.
7 Donna Dickenson, Me Medicine vs We Medicine: Reclaiming Biotechnology for the
Common Good (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013).
8 A senior editor of a genomics journal, interviewed in Juengst et al., ‘From “personalized” to
“precision” medicine’, p. 23.
9 Navigenics advertising, quoted in Dickenson,Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 32.
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to individual health that stresses the importance and validity of DTC
tests in taking control of one’s own health.10
But are these promises of empowerment illusory? ‘The weakness of
“personalized genomic medicine”, as a promissory label for what
genomics might bring to health care, is that it promises more than
genomics can actually deliver – both in terms of increased patient
empowerment and in terms of the individualization of care.’11
Perhaps personalised medicine might even diminish patient choice
by denying patients treatments which they would like to have but to
which they are unlikely to respond. Or it might leave that decision
more firmly in the hands of physicians and genetic counsellors, oper-
ating on the pharmacogenetic ethos of ‘the right treatment for the right
patient at the right time’. But the inevitable corollary is ‘the wrong
treatment for the wrong patient at the wrong time’, conceivably mean-
ing ‘no treatment’ for patients whose genomic profiles make them less
likely to respond.12
Rationing decisions such as these are only the start of the ethical and
social issues arising from personalised medicine. Interpreted broadly,
personalised medicine can encompass a whole gamut of new biotechnol-
ogies, united mainly by their common emphasis on patient choice and
empowerment. As a prominent example, ‘enhancement technologies’,
such as neurocognitive stimulation techniques, brain–computer inter-
faces, drugs to improve mental functioning, and, most controversially,
germline genetic modification, can be seen as a form of personalised
medicine. They are typically predicated on the individualistic ethos of
‘being the best Me I can possibly be’.13
Yet the original ideals behind the rise of genomic medicine were
communitarian, not individualistic: they symbolise ‘We’ rather than
‘Me’ Medicine. This ‘We’ may refer to a variety of concerns: our
genetic relatedness, ideals of solidarity and distributive justice, or
global public goods such as the genetic commons. The ideal of the
genome as the common heritage of humanity permeates the inter-
national scientific community’s 1996 ‘Bermuda statement’, which
declares: ‘All human genome sequence information from
a publicly funded project should be freely available in the public
10 E.g. Francis Collins, The Language of Life: DNA and the Revolution in Personalized
Medicine (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2010).
11 Juengst et al., ‘From “personalized” to “precision” medicine’, p. 30.
12 Dickenson,Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 72.
13 Dickenson,Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 113.
4 donna dickenson et al.
domain.’14 Likewise, article 1 of the 1997 UNESCO Universal
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights stipulates:
‘In a symbolic sense, the human genome is the common heritage of
humanity.’
Does personalised medicine undermine and threaten this concep-
tion of the ‘common good’? If more resources are dedicated to preci-
sion medicine, for example, will less attention be paid to public
health?15 That could be counterproductive in overall population
terms, bearing in mind that it was public health initiatives such as
improved sanitation and screening that radically improved lifespan
figures in the twentieth-century Western world by lessening the inci-
dence of contagious disease.
This phenomenon is not ‘merely’ historic; nor is it limited to
infectious disease. ‘Most of the recent successes in cancer care have
resulted from the traditional public health measures of screening, early
detection and smoking reduction as well as some immunologic
therapies.’16 Even two of the most prominent ‘poster children’ for
genomic medicine, the BRCA1/2 genes implicated in some breast
and ovarian cancers and the discovery of specific cystic fibrosis muta-
tions responsive to recently developed drugs, have arguably had less
effect than ‘We Medicine’. ‘Although well-deserved recognition has
accompanied these genetic discoveries, neither has been a significant
factor in the substantial reduction in mortality from the two target
diseases during the past 25 years. The commitment to screening
technology and adherence to best practices has proven far more
important to the lives of affected patients.’17 More broadly, it has
been argued that a solidarity-based ‘We Medicine perspective’ could
allow us to formulate better policies in areas ranging from palliative
care to organ donation.18
14 HUGO (Human Genome Organization), Summary of Principles Agreed at the
International Strategy Meeting on Human Genome Sequencing (‘Bermuda Statement’)
(London: Wellcome Trust, 1996).
15 W. Burke et al., ‘Extending the range of public health genomics: what should be the
agenda for public health in an era of genome-based and “personalized”medicine?’ (2010)
12 Genetics in Medicine 785–91.
16 Michael J. Joyner and Nigel Paneth, ‘Seven questions for personalized medicine’ (2015)
314(10) JAMA 999–1000, p. 999.
17 Ibid.
18 Barbara Prainsack, ‘The “We” in the “Me”: solidarity and health care in the era of
personalized medicine’ (2018) 43(1) Science, Technology and Human Values 21–44.
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1.3 Digital Health and Personalised Medicine
All these developments regarding personalised medicine need to be seen
in connection with the digital health (or e-health) revolution. In 2017 the
digital health industry was already worth US$25 billion globally.19Digital
health includes diverse technologies, e.g. automated algorithm-based
decisional support systems, mobile health apps (m-health) monitoring
health-related behaviours, remote consultations (or ‘telemedicine’) and
Electronic Health Records (EHRs). Staggeringly, 153,000 m-health apps
have been released since 2015, bringing the worldwide total to 320,000.20
For most of these technologies, robust governance is lacking.21
These technologies also result in an increasing ‘pile’ of Big Data.
Increasingly, as in other contexts (not only businesses but also election
campaigns, for example), in healthcare, too, attempts are made to link
disparate data sets at the individual person level. New kinds of data
collection, linkage and analysis are expected to profoundly transform
clinical medicine, public health and epidemiology.
In her hugely impressive article in The Lancet on ‘The art of medicine’,
Inmaculada de Melo-Martin analyses the impact on current-day medi-
cine of the Cartesian concept of the human body as a machine. Although
this model has resulted in unquestionable benefits from the biomedical
sciences, she adds this caveat:
[I]t also underlies the belief that the goal of medicine is to somehow
eliminate human vulnerability. Because contemporary biomedical
sciences ask questions oriented to that end, it is not surprising that their
responses tend to sustain medical practices that are directed to produce
cures. Of course, we cannot emphasise enough the importance of curing
human diseases. But excessive emphasis on this goal runs the risk of
disregarding those things that cannot be cured, such as disabilities and
chronic illnesses. This goal also underscores the emphasis on individual
solutions to problems that might best be addressed by attending to social
and economic aspects, and hence the common lack of attention given to
public health solutions.22
19
‘Does mobile health matter?’ (2017) 390 The Lancet 2216. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(17)
32899–4.
20 IQVIA, ‘The growing value of digital health in the United Kingdom: evidence and impact
on human health and the healthcare system’ (7 November 2017). www.iqvia.com/insti
tute/reports/the-growing-value-of-digital-health (Accessed 11 February 2018).
21 Rishi Duggal, Ingrid Brindle and Jessamy Bagenal, ‘Editorial: Digital healthcare: regulat-
ing the revolution’ (2018) British Medical Journal 360:k6. doi:10.1136/bmj.k6.
22 Immaculada de Melo-Martin, ‘The art of medicine – Vulnerability and ethics: consider-
ing our Cartesian hangover’ (2009) 373 The Lancet 1244–45.
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Promises of ever more cures where none were previously available can be
found throughout the ‘personalisedmedicine’ rhetoric, to an increasingly
embarrassing extent, as explained powerfully by Stanford epidemiologist
John Ioannidis:
I have had great excitement about the prospects of omics, big data,
personalized medicine, precision medicine, and all. Much of my effort
has been to put together these efforts with rigorous statistical methods and
EBM (Evidence-Based Medicine) tools. But I am tired of seeing the same
overrated promises recast again and again. For example, several years ago
I gave an invited lecture at a leading institution on the danger of making
inflated promises in personalizedmedicine. Right after my talk, everybody
rushed to hear the launch of a new campaign, where the leader of the
institution singled out this unique historic moment: that institution
would single-handedly eliminate most major types of cancer within
a few years. Several years have passed, and none of these cancer types
have disappeared. I recently tried to find the name of that campaign online
but realized that this institution has launched many similar campaigns.
Which among many was the unique historic moment that I happened to
be at? Multiply this by thousands of institutions, and there are already
millions of unique historic moments where cancer was eliminated.
The same applies to neurologic diseases and more. I do not understand
why academic leaders and politicians need to make such self-
embarrassing announcements now and then.23
1.4 Me Medicine vs We Medicine
To examine these wide-ranging and global questions, this volume brings
together an international array of scholars from various disciplines,
including law, bioethics, anthropology and sociology, to exchange ideas
on the tensions between Me Medicine and We Medicine.
One of the recurring questions in the contributions to this book is what
Me and We exactly mean in this context. As various authors argue,
personalised medicine gives rise to new conceptions of the self and the
communal. What kind of concept of the person is implied by the notion
of personalised medicine: a geneticised self, quantified self, potential self,
fictional self, consumer self? And what is the nature of community and
the common good implicit in We Medicine: collective morality, social
solidarity or rather new types of commons, such as ‘genome-commons’
(e.g. the human genome as common heritage of mankind), ‘bio-
23 John Ioannidis, ‘Evidence-based medicine has been hijacked: a report to David Sackett’
(2016) 73 Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 82–6.
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commons’ (e.g. sharing DNA samples) and ‘data-commons’ (e.g. promo-
tion of early data disclosure and release)?24
Moreover, many of the chapters offer reflection on the causes of the
spectacular rise of the rhetoric of personalised medicine. One of us has
argued25 that four possible explanations can be distinguished, with some
emerging from further analysis as more plausible than others. These four
explanations also resurface in most of the chapters and can be charac-
terised as follows.
A first possibility is that the personalisation of healthcare is rooted in
a more general sense of threat and contamination in society. For exam-
ple, the fear of contamination can be recognised in the growing lack of
confidence in public health resources. Second, the popularity of products
and services in the field of Me Medicine, such as DTC tests, could be
understood against the background of a broader trend towards narcis-
sism and a fixation on the self. Third, it seems likely that corporate
interests also fuel the fascination for personalised medicine. The highly
lucrative and still expanding market in products and services based on
personalised medicine suggests a correlation between the emergence of
personalised medicine on the one hand, and the rise of neoliberal politics
and the privatisation of most domains of life on the other. Last, the
rhetoric surrounding personalised medicine alludes to a celebration of
personal choice, personal empowerment and personal autonomy. From
this perspective, the belief in personalised medicine as the new panacea is
intimately connected to modern society’s belief in the ‘sacredness of
personal choice and individualism’.26
These four hypotheses have engaged the attention of many of our
contributors, allowing a more sophisticated and multi-disciplinary ana-
lysis of the phenomenon of personalised medicine to be united under
a shared framework. In the next section we summarise each of their
contributions separately.
1.5 Overview
In their chapter, ‘Personalised Medicine and the Politics of Human
Nuclear Genome Transfer’, philosopher and bioethicist Françoise
24 Bartha M. Knoppers and Vural Özdemir, ‘The concept of humanity and biogenetics’ in
Britta van Beers, Luigi Corrias andWouter Werner (eds.),Humanity across International
Law and Biolaw (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
25 Dickenson,Me Medicine vs We Medicine, pp. 10–29.
26 Dickenson,Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 24.
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Baylis and feminist political scientist Alana Cattapan offer an important
contribution to the debate on the governance of human nuclear genome
transfer, commonly (but incorrectly) known as ‘mitochondrial replace-
ment’. This emerging reproductive technology aims to provide women
who are genetic carriers of certain mitochodrial diseases with the possi-
bility of reproducing without passing on their mitochondrial DNA to
their offspring. The result would be the creation of ‘three-parent babies’,
with genetic material from two women and one man. In their thought-
provoking analysis Baylis and Cattapan argue that the rise of human
nuclear genome transfer should be understood as part of the current
movement towards the personalisation of healthcare; as such, they claim,
it deserves a critical examination. They subsequently argue against the
implementation of this technology by fruitfully engaging with
Dickenson’s aforementioned four possible explanations for the rise of
personalised medicine. According to Baylis and Cattapan, Dickenson’s
first explanation resurfaces in the context of human nuclear genome in
the shape of a fear of genetic contamination of one’s familial DNA,
against which this technology would offer protection. They then engage
with Dickenson’s second hypothesis – narcissism and bowling alone – by
highlighting how an important part of this technology’s appeal rests on
a short-sighted prioritisation of genetic relatedness above all other inter-
ests. As to Dickenson’s third explanation, Baylis and Cattapan describe
how the fertility industry’s huge commercial interests are steering the
development and marketing of this reproductive technology. Finally,
they argue that ‘the sacredness of personal choice’ has also clearly affected
the reception of human nuclear genome transfer. The rhetoric surround-
ing this technology emphasises the right to have genetically related
children who are free of mitochondrial disease, and obfuscates the risks
that are at stake, such as the intergenerational effects of altering the
genome.
Extending the scope of personalisedmedicine beyond genomic science
into an unexpected and novel area, bioethicist Heidi Mertes applies the
concept to ‘Stem Cell-Derived Gametes and Uterus Transplants’.
Although both of these experimental techniques are far from being
mainstream, they implicitly rely for their justification on the conven-
tional view of ‘reproductive autonomy’ as a personal right.
The sacredness of personal choice and the importance attached to genetic
parenthood chime with this view. Likewise, the hypothesis that ‘Me
Medicine’ derives its popularity from a fear of threat and contamination
also seems to be supported by fear of third-party involvement in the
introduction 9
formation of a family, Mertes suggests. However, she concludes that ‘it is
far from obvious that the desire for genetic or gestational parenthood can
trump considerations for the welfare of the future child and for the safety
of the other parties involved (in the case of uterus transplantation), or
that it can justify resource allocation to these new reproductive technol-
ogies.’ She ends her analysis by exploring what measures a less indivi-
dualistic approach to infertility might entail: one rooted in the
‘We Medicine’ concept of the common good.
Reproductive ethics is also the concern of Jyotsna Agnihotri Gupta,
a sociologist who works on reproductive and genetic technologies from
a gender perspective, in her original and important study combining
media analysis, interviews and participant observation: ‘Personalising
Future Health Risk through “Biological Insurance”: Proliferation of
Private Umbilical Cord Blood Banking in India’. Private cord blood
banking epitomises ‘Me Medicine’ in its ostensible concentration on
the individual’s future well-being, rather than the collective’s health,
which is better served by public banks. In India, however, public banks
are few and far between, whereas private banking is very much on the
rise. Gupta provides extensive detail on the Indian private cord blood
industry – potentially the largest supplier in the world – along with
interview results from patients and doctors alike. Locating the private
cord blood phenomenon not only within the ‘Me Medicine’ framework
but also in the literature on risk theory, Gupta documents the construc-
tion of a new kind of patient: the ‘at-risk’ individual who needs a form of
personalised medicine from birth: the moment when cord blood is taken.
A different dimension of the tensions between We Medicine and Me
Medicine is explored in the chapter, ‘Combating the Trade in Organs:
Why We Should Preserve the Communal Nature of Organ
Transplantation’ by Kristof Van Assche. Van Assche, who is a legal
expert on organ donation and transplantation, offers a powerful and
highly critical examination of recent proposals to introduce elements of
free market economics into systems of organ donation. Even if organ
selling is still banned in most legal systems, ‘as altruistic kidney donation
symbolizes We Medicine at its noblest’,27 the call for a regulated market
in organs is becoming louder in reaction to the continuing shortage in
organs. Van Assche’s ardent defence of the existing altruistic system rests
on two lines of argumentation. His first argument is that a regulated
organ market is likely to lead to the exact opposite of what proponents
27 Dickenson,Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 72.
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hope to achieve. As a result of the inability to control all market transac-
tions, such a system cannot prevent organ patients from accessing black
markets for organs, either in their own country or abroad. Moreover,
a regulated market may crowd out altruistic organ donation. Finally, he
stresses the problematic account of autonomy that underlies proposals to
allow individuals to sell their organs. In the second part of his chapter,
Van Assche expands his critical analysis of regulated markets in organs
by connecting the issue with the debate on the commodification of the
human body and by engaging with different theories of property. He
argues that both utilitarian and Lockean theories of property fail to
properly justify property rights in organs. Conversely, according to Van
Assche, only personhood theories of property are able to recognise the
grave immaterial harms at stake in organ vending.
In her chapter on one of the greatest global challenges in the twenty-first
century, Alzheimer’s disease – an untreatable disease whose prevalence
and financial and social consequences are reaching epidemic proportions –
legal scholar Robin Pierce addresses the We/Me Medicine aspects of
research and development of diagnostic tests and therapeutic treatments.
It may well be that Alzheimer’s disease is in fact an umbrella term covering
a range of separate diseases, some of which have a genetic cause while
others do not. Until the cause of and possible treatments for the disease are
discovered, research and development clearly falls into the We Medicine
category, even though some of the diagnostic tests being developed are so
complicated and expensive that their widespread deployment could cur-
rently only be considered to belong to the realms of research and Me
Medicine. However, as Pierce powerfully explains, there is a danger that
any cures which are developed would be applicable to and affordable by
only a small minority. Thus, the development of such cures by commercial
entities risks being Me Medicine only. Indeed, ‘When There Is No Cure:
Challenges for Collective Approaches to Alzheimer’s Disease’ shows that
public pressure may be necessary to ensure that cures are developed for
more than just a ‘favoured few’: without deliberate consideration through-
out the R&D and translational process, collective approaches to the
Alzheimer’s crisis may lose ground to commercially more profitable indi-
vidualised approaches.
In his chapter, ‘Lost and Found: Relocating the Individual in the Age of
Intensified Data Sourcing in European Healthcare’, Klaus Hoeyer, who
specialises in anthropology and medical science and technology studies,
investigates the implications of ‘data sourcing’. To an increasing extent,
health data are created, collected, curated, stored and used for diverse
introduction 11
purposes. Denmark is the primary example described in this chapter
because the Danish government prescribes a form of solidarity that
Hoeyer associates with We Medicine: people deliver data in the process
of receiving, or in exchange for, publicly financed healthcare; and the
data can be used for research that promotes the common good. Thanks
to the use of personal identity numbers in all encounters with public
services, Danish health data can be combined with data on socio-
economic and educational status from employers and tax authorities.
Denmark takes a more radical approach to the facilitation of research
than the other Nordic countries: since 2014, Danish citizens can no
longer opt out from being contacted by researchers wanting further
information from them. Hoeyer considers the rights and wrongs of
establishing such comprehensive national public health and social
information databases, based on what boils down to ‘conscription’ of
personal data. Moreover, these data registries are increasingly used by
the government to attract international investment in the Danish
pharmaceutical industry. Hoeyer argues that the Danish registries
hold great promise for the development of new therapeutic treatments
and the improvement of current ones, for example, by allowing the
identification of unknown side-effects of drugs. Although identifying
some Me Medicine aspects in the Danish approach, he concludes that
its We Medicine associated benefits outweigh the drawbacks.
Nonetheless, a key task is to ensure that the collective goods do not
become redirected into private pockets and that collectives help each
other to counter individual risks.
In their chapter, ‘Presuming the Promotion of the Common Good by
Large-Scale Health Research: The Cases of care.data 2.0 and the 100,000
Genomes Project in the UK’, philosopher and bioethicist Sigrid Sterckx,
social scientist Sandi Dheensa and patent attorney Julian Cockbain offer
an analysis of recent efforts by the UK government to expand the
possibilities for collecting health-related data from UK citizens.
The first part of their chapter consists of an examination of the political
statements, official reports and legal documents used by the government
to introduce both care.data and the 100,000 Genomes Project.
In the second part, they build on this analysis to identify several ethically
highly problematic aspects of these recent initiatives, such as their under-
lying consent model. One of the most striking findings of the authors’
ethical analysis is that the UK government tries to promote its policy by
appealing to what are essentially We Medicine values. However, as the
authors argue, upon closer inspection it emerges that behind this thin
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layer of obfuscatory language hides a Me Medicine approach to health
data, rooted in what, essentially, is a neoliberal political agenda.
In their chapter, ‘My Genome, My Right’, sociologist Stuart Hogarth,
patent attorney Julian Cockbain and bioethicist Sigrid Sterckx consider
the claim that people have the right to access their genomic data, e.g.
using direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies such as 23andMe,
and that that right extends to the use (and publication) of such data in
any desired way. In effect, the claim is to an ownership right that corre-
sponds to the central libertarian claim to self-ownership of the body and
all body material. The authors, however, argue that the libertarians
conflate a right to ownership of material, a rivalrous good, with a right
to own information, a non-rivalrous good to which others may also
legitimately claim control rights since genetic information is shared
with relatives, at least. Accordingly, while the authors propose a human
right to access personal genetic information, subject to regulatory control
to ensure counselling where appropriate, they argue that, to protect the
rights of others, not least to privacy, the person has no right to publish
their ‘own’ genetic data. The ‘Me Medicine’ of personal control is
trumped by the ‘We Medicine’ of privacy.
‘“The Best Me I Can Possibly Be”: Legal Subjectivity, Self-Authorship
and Wrongful Life Actions in an Age of “Genomic Torts”’, written by
legal scholar and philosopher Britta van Beers, demonstrates the neces-
sity of a legal perspective on personalised medicine. This chapter demon-
strates how the ‘person’ in personalised medicine is connected with the
legal understanding of a ‘person’ as a bearer of legal rights and respon-
sibilities. However, this emphasis is changing. In her analysis of new
types of legal claims that affect the law’s understanding of the ‘person’,
van Beers focuses on the emerging area of ‘genomic torts’. Who, if
anyone, is liable to compensate the children or their parents if children
are conceived and born with disabling conditions that could have been
detected or predicted before birth, or sometimes even before conception?
Should responsibility lie with the physician who fails to offer appropriate
tests, the parents who, knowingly or not, allow pregnancy to go to term,
or society in general? Recently, two forms of legal action have come into
focus: wrongful birth (an action against the physicians by the parents)
and wrongful life (an action against the parents by the children). Britta
van Beers investigates two different interpretations of a wrongful life
claim (a right not to be born or a right to be born in a different body) and
explains why both are problematic. Interestingly, she also discusses the
potential effects that recent developments in gene-editing, such as the
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CRISPR-Cas9 technique, may have on wrongful life actions. Moreover,
gene-editing and preimplantation diagnostics run the risk of enhancing
parental antenatal and pre-conception obligations and of transforming
the responsibility for ensuring the welfare of the handicapped child from
being a societal responsibility into a personal one. The analysis under-
taken by van Beers clearly shows why wrongful birth and wrongful life
claims are emblematic of a Me Medicine approach to regulation, i.e. an
approach that views the legal issues involved in reproductive medicine as
disputes between individuals about personal rights and entitlements, and
why we should be concerned about the radically individualistic model of
self-authorship that underlies this approach.
In their innovative chapter, ‘I Run, You Run,We Run: A Philosophical
Approach to Health and Fitness Apps’, philosopher Marli Huijer and
design researcher and philosopher Christian Detweiler focus on self-
tracking technologies as a new kind of Me Medicine. Also known as
Quantified Self or Personal Informatics, these popular applications osten-
sibly reflect the individualistic enhancement ideal of ‘becoming the best
Me I can possibly be’.28However, Huijer and Detweiler question whether
these technologies do actually empower individuals. A Foucauldian ana-
lysis, they argue, might instead suggest that ‘there is concern that perso-
nal informatics technologies submit their users to disciplinary forces that
seduce or force the individual to take responsibility for their own health’
as a means of governing the self, a form of voluntary self-surveillance.
By expanding the scope of what counts as personalised medicine and
sceptically questioning its rhetoric of individual choice and empower-
ment, the authors offer an unexpected counter-analysis to the prevalent
optimistic discourse on precision medicine.
Similar concerns are further developed from a psychoanalytical per-
spective by philosopher of science Hub Zwart in his chapter,
‘The Molecularised Me: Psychoanalysing Personalised Medicine and
Self-Tracking’. The emergence of wearable tracking devices can be seen
as a ‘second revolution’, bringing together paradigm shifts in computer
technology and genomic sequencing. A ‘quantified self’ has emerged:
what Zwart calls ‘a digital version of the superego’. Self-knowledge in this
new context links to but transcends narcissism: as Zwart puts it, ‘Self-
tracking devices purport to provide access to our molecularised uncon-
scious.’ Supposedly, these developments transform us all into proactive
and empowered bio-citizens, reducing physicians to mere assistants or
28 Dickenson,Me Medicine vs We Medicine, p. 113.
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managers and promoting the ideal of citizen health science. But do they
actually represent a new form of surveillance like Jeremy Bentham’s
panopticon? – what Zwart calls ‘a ubiquitous electronic panopticon,
a molecularised version of the super-ego, the voice of conscience of the
terabyte age’. Like Huijer and Detweiler, Zwart is concerned that this
enhancement-orientated form of MeMedicine actually forces a powerful
new form of discipline on its users, rather than increasing their
autonomy.
Each chapter in this book in its own way offers a critical exam-
ination of the grand claims made by the ‘evangelists’ of personalised
medicine. Does personalised medicine truly bring about a revolution
in medicine by offering tailor-made medical treatment? Can this new
approach indeed do justice to patients’ biogenetic uniqueness and as
such empower them to make better-informed choices about their
health? Which values and interests are championed by Me
Medicine’s promissory discourse, and which are neglected? And
how can the sudden rise and wide appeal of personalised medicine
be explained?
As both the disciplinary richness of the chapters and the wide variety
of themes with which they engage indicate, the increasing dominance of
Me Medicine approaches over We Medicine approaches is also inti-
mately connected to other developments, such as the hegemony in
bioethics and biolaw of the principle of autonomy,29 the dominance of
rights discourse at the cost of attention for more collective interests,30 the
commodification of the human body31 and human reproduction,32 and
29 For critical discussions of the primacy of autonomy in bioethics in the context of
genomics, see, inter alia, Bartha M. Knoppers and Ruth Chadwick, ‘Human genetic
research: Emerging trends in ethics’ (2005) 6 Nature Reviews Genetics 75–9; Michael
J. Sandel, The Case Against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Engineering (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2007); Heather Widdows, The Connected Self. The Ethics and
Governance of the Genetic Individual (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
30 Mary A. Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York, NY:
Free Press, 1991); Costas Douzinas, ‘The paradoxes of human rights’ (2013) 20(1)
Constellations 51–67.
31 Margaret J. Radin, Contested Commodities: The Trouble with Trade in Sex, Children, Body
Parts, and Other Things (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996);
Donna Dickenson, Body Shopping: The Economy Fuelled by Flesh and Blood (Oxford:
Oneworld Publications, 2008).
32 Michele Goodwin (ed.), Baby Markets: Money and the New Politics of Creating Families
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Britta van Beers, ‘Is Europe “giving
in to baby markets?” Reproductive tourism in Europe and the gradual erosion of existing
legal limits to reproductive markets’ (2014) 23(1)Medical Law Review 103–34.
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the datafication of healthcare.33One of the aspirations of this book is also
to contribute to academic reflection on these important themes.
Moreover, although it is true that the chapters in this book generally
focus onMeMedicine’s more problematic aspects, it would be too easy to
conclude that the book’s central message is that personalised medicine is
bad news and that efforts in this field should therefore be abandoned.
Instead, it is our hope that, by exploring the frictions between Me
Medicine and We Medicine, between individual choice and the common
good, this book can fuel and stimulate the debate about personalised
medicine and enable its participants to come to a more balanced under-
standing of the interests and values at stake.
33 Jonathan H. Chen and Steven M. Asch, ‘Machine learning and prediction in medicine –
Beyond the peak of inflated expectations’ (2017) 376 (26) New England Journal of
Medicine 2507–9; K. A. Oye, G. Jain, M. Amador et al., ‘The next Frontier: Fostering
innovation by improving health data access and utilization’ (2015) 98 (5) Clinical
Pharmacology & Therapeutics 514–21.
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